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ABSTRACT
Many state-of-the-art machine learning models such as deep
neural networks have recently shown to be vulnerable to
adversarial perturbations, especially in classification tasks.
Motivated by adversarial machine learning, in this paper we
investigate the robustness of sparse regression models with
strongly correlated covariates to adversarially designed mea-
surement noises. Specifically, we consider the family of
ordered weighted `1 (OWL) regularized regression methods
and study the case of OSCAR (octagonal shrinkage cluster-
ing algorithm for regression) in the adversarial setting. Under
a norm-bounded threat model, we formulate the process of
finding a maximally disruptive noise for OWL-regularized
regression as an optimization problem and illustrate the steps
towards finding such a noise in the case of OSCAR. Exper-
imental results demonstrate that the regression performance
of grouping strongly correlated features can be severely de-
graded under our adversarial setting, even when the noise
budget is significantly smaller than the ground-truth signals.
Index Terms— Adversarial machine learning, ordered
weighted `1 norm, OWL-regularized regression, OSCAR
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, adversarial machine learning has received
tremendous attention as it provides new means of improv-
ing machine leaning performance and studying model robust-
ness in the adversarial setting, such as generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [1] and adversarial examples [2]. In im-
age classification tasks, well-trained machine learning mod-
els such as deep convolutional neural networks have shown to
be vulnerable to adversarial examples – human-imperceptible
perturbations to natural images can be easily crafted to mis-
lead the decision of a target image classifier [3, 4, 5], leading
to new challenges on model robustness. The adversarial per-
turbations are often evaluated by the `1, `2 and `∞ norms
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Beyond image classification, other machine
learning tasks such as image captioning [11] or sequence-to-
sequence text learning [12] have also shown to be vulnerable
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to adversarial examples. Moreover, it has been made possible
to generate adversarial examples in the so-called black-box
setting by simply leveraging the input-output correspondence
of a target model and performing zeroth-order optimization
[13, 14, 15].
Motivated by the recent studies in adversarial machine
learning, in this paper we shift our focus to the robustness
of regression models to adversarial perturbations. To the best
of our knowledge, regression is a fundamental task in ma-
chine learning but little has been explored in the setting of
adversarial perturbations. Specifically, we aim to investigate
the robustness of the ordinary least-squared regression models
regularized by the ordered weighted `1 (OWL) norm [16, 17].
The OWL family of regularizers is a widely adopted method
for sparse regression with strongly correlated covariates. It is
worth mentioning that the octagonal shrinkage and clustering
algorithm for regression [18], which is called as OSCAR, is
in fact a special case of the OWL regularizer [19]. OSCAR
is known to be more effective in identifying feature groups
(i.e., strongly correlated covariates) than other feature selec-
tion methods such as LASSO [20].
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of OSCAR to
adversarial perturbations by formulating the process of find-
ing the maximally disruptive noise of the measurement model
as an optimization problem. Although the recent work in
[21] has established a finite-sample error upper bound on the
OWL-regularized regression models associated with a norm-
bounded noise level, it still remains unclear whether an adver-
sary can disrupt the identified feature groups by intentionally
manipulating the measurement error within the same noise
budget. In other words, our adversarial formulation is novel
in the sense that it provides a worst-case robustness analy-
sis of OSCAR by finding a disruptive measurement error (but
still within a specified noise budget) in order to deviate the
detected feature groups from the ground truths. More im-
portantly, upon verifying the lack of robustness to adversar-
ial perturbations, our method could be incorporated to devise
resilient OWL-regularized regression models via adversarial
learning techniques.
Perhaps surprisingly, the experimental results show that
using our proposed approach, it is possible to generate small
norm-bounded perturbations to the measurement model, in
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order to deviate the regression results of OSCAR from the
ground truths. Consequently, our results offer new insights on
the robustness analysis of OWL-regularized regression meth-
ods in the adversarial setting.
2. BACKGROUND
For any real-valued vector x = [x1, x2, . . . , xp] ∈ Rp, let
|x| denote the vector of its element-wise absolute value and
let |x|↓ denote the element-permuted vector of |x| such that
|x|↓1 ≥ |x|↓2 ≥ . . . ≥ |x|↓p, where |x|↓i is the i-th largest com-
ponent of x. Given a vector w ∈ Rp+ such that w1 ≥ w2 ≥
. . . ≥ 0 and w1 > 0, the OWL norm [16, 17] is defined as
Ωw(x) =
p∑
i=1
wi|x|↓i . (1)
The OSCAR regularizer [18] is a special case of the OWL
norm in (1) when wi = λ1 + λ2(p− i), where λ1, λ2 ≥ 0.
We consider the OWL-regularized linear regression prob-
lem taking the following form:
Minimize x∈Rp‖y −Ax‖22 + λΩw(x), (2)
where y ∈ Rn is the vector of n noisy measurements, A ∈
Rn×p is the design matrix, and λ ≥ 0 is the regularization
parameter of the OWL norm.
The seminal work in [21] establishes a finite-sample error
bound on the OWL-regularized regression method under the
measurement model
y = Ax∗ + ν, (3)
where x∗ ∈ Rp is an s-sparse vector (i.e., the signal) and
ν ∈ Rn is the measurement error (i.e., the noise). Let x∗
denote the vector with identical coefficients corresponding
to identical columns in A, and assume the entries in each
column of A are i.i.d. N (0, 1) (standard Gaussian random
variables) but different columns could be strongly correlated.
Consider the `1-norm bounded measurement error constraint‖ν‖1
n ≤ , then the solution x̂ to (2) is guaranteed to satisfy
the finite-sample error upper bound [21]:
E‖x̂− x∗‖2 ≤ C1
(
C2‖x∗‖2
√
s log p
n
+ 
)
, (4)
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes the `2 norm, the expectation E is taken
over the random design matrix A, and C1 and C2 are some
positive constants that we omitted for brevity (see Theorem
1.1 in [21]). Note that in this finite-sample analysis no distri-
butional assumptions are imposed on the measurement error
ν other than its bounded `1 norm. Similar error bound can
be obtained when the rows of A are i.i.d. Gaussian random
vectors [21].
In general, the solution x̂ to (2) can be efficiently obtained
by leveraging the proximal operator ProxΩw(·) of OWL regu-
larization. As illustrated in [22], one can use the fast iterative
shrinkage-thresholding algorithm (FISTA) [23] to obtain x̂,
which includes iterating the following optimization steps:
1. OWL proximal gradient descent –
x(k) = ProxλΩw
(
u(k) −AT (Au(k) − y)/αk
)
2. Momentum – u(k+1) = x(k) + βk
(
x(k) − x(k−1))
3. Update αk and βk if not converged
The index k denotes the FISTA iteration, and αk and βk de-
note the inverse of the step size and the momentum coeffi-
cient, respectively. The notation ·T denotes matrix transpose.
Specifically, when the OWL regularizer reduces to OS-
CAR, its approximate proximity operator (APO) has a closed-
form expression given by [19]
ProxOSCAR-APO(z) = sign(z)max{|z| − w˜, 0}, (5)
where sign(·) is the vector of entry-wise sign function (+1 or
−1), denotes entry-wise product, max{z, 0} denotes entry-
wise maximum value between zi and 0, and w˜ = P(z)Tw,
where P(z) is a permutation matrix associated with a given
vector z ∈ Rp satisfying P(z)|z| = |z|↓, which can be ob-
tained by taking |z| and sorting its entries in descending order.
In addition, for OSCAR the vectorw in OWL has the relation
wi = λ1 + λ2(p− i), where λ1, λ2 ≥ 0.
3. MAIN RESULTS
Although a finite-sample analysis for OWL-regularized re-
gression has been established under the `1-norm constrained
measurement error  in [21], motivated by the recent advances
in adversarial machine learning, we are interested in investi-
gating its robustness to adversarially designed noises satisfy-
ing the same error budget . In other words, given an `1-norm
bounded threat model ‖ν‖1n ≤  and a design matrix A, we
aim to find an optimal noise ν∗ that could maximally degrade
the performance of OWL-regularized regression in terms of
the detected feature groups. In this paper, we particularly fo-
cus on the case of OSCAR with APO as its solver.
Under the same measurement model as in (3), we formu-
late the problem of finding a norm-bounded noise ν∗ that
could maximally deviate the OWL-regularized regression x̂
from the ground-truth feature cluster membership vector x∗
by solving
Maximizeν∈Rn ‖x̂(ν)− x∗‖22 (6)
subject to ‖ν‖1/n ≤ , (7)
x̂(ν) = arg min
x∈Rp
‖y −Ax‖22 + λΩw(x). (8)
Essentially, our adversarial formulation studies the robustness
of OWL-regularized regression in the worst-case scenario by
exploring the space of constrained measurement noise to
maximize the feature group identification loss in (6). In our
setting, we assume the adversary has access to the ground-
truth vector x∗ so that based on (3), (8) can be written as
x̂(ν) = arg min
x∈Rp
‖A(x∗ − x) + ν‖22 + λΩw(x). (9)
Next we specify how to solve the adversarial regression
formulation in (6) to (8) in the case of OSCAR with APO as
its solver. Let u∗ and α∗ be the final iterates of the momentum
and step size terms in FISTA as described in Section 2. Given
the measurement model (3) under OSCAR-APO, (9) becomes
x̂(ν) = ProxOSCAR-APO
(
u∗ −AT (Au∗ − y)/α∗)
= ProxOSCAR-APO
(
u∗ −AT (Au∗ −Ax∗ − ν)/α∗) ,
(10)
where ProxOSCAR-APO(·) is defined in (5). With the method of
Lagrange multipliers, we are interested in solving the follow-
ing alternative optimization problem
Minimizeν∈Rn − ‖x̂(ν)− x∗‖22 +
γ
n
‖ν‖1, (11)
where γ > 0 is a tunable regularization coefficient such
that the solution ν∗ to (11) will satisfy the norm constraint
‖ν∗‖1/n ≤ .
We note that the formulation in (11) falls into the cate-
gory of LASSO problem [20] and can be efficiently solved
by using optimization methods such as iterative shrinkage-
thresholding algorithm (ISTA). Specifically, let f(ν) =
−‖x̂(ν)− x∗‖22. Then ν∗ (possibly a local optimum) can be
obtained by iteratively solving
ν(k+1) = Sγ/n
(
ν(k) − ηk∇f(ν(k))
)
, (12)
where ν(k) denotes the k-th iterate, ηk is the step size, ∇f
denotes the gradient of f 1, and Sρ(z) : Rn 7→ Rn is an entry-
wise function defined as
Sρ(zi) =
 zi − ρ, if zi > ρ;0, if |zi| ≤ ρ;−zi + ρ, if zi < −ρ. (13)
In what follows, we explicitly derive the gradient∇f(ν) =
[ ∂f∂ν1 ,
∂f
∂ν2
, . . . , ∂f∂νn ]
T of f(ν) with respect to ν for OSCAR-
APO. For clarity, the index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} specifies the
measurement instance, and the index j ∈ {1, . . . , p} spec-
ifies the covariate instance. To simplify the notation, let
b(ν) = u∗ − AT (Au∗ − Ax∗ − ν)/α∗ such that x̂(ν) =
ProxOSCAR-APO(b) = sign(b)max{|b|−w˜, 0} based on (5),
where w˜ = P(b)Tw. Rewriting f(ν) = −∑pj=1([x̂(ν)]j −
x∗j )
2 = −∑pj=1[sign(bj) · max{|bj | − w˜j , 0} − x∗j ]2 and
1We use the subgradient of f at points where f is not differentiable.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial perturbation for OSCAR-APO
Input: A, x∗, x∗, w, u∗, α∗, , {ηk}
Output: ν∗
Initialization: k = 0, γ = γ0, g ∼ N (0, In) and ν(0) =
 · g/‖g‖1
while not converged do
1. b = u∗ −AT (Au∗ −Ax∗ − ν(k)) /α∗
2. Find the permutation P(b) s.t. P(b)|b| = |b|↓
3. w˜ = P(b)Tw
4. ∂f∂νi =
∑
j:|bj |>w˜j −2
(
bj − sign(bj)w˜j − x∗j
) · Aijα∗
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
5. ν(k+1) = Sγ/n
(
ν(k) − ηk∇f(ν(k))
)
6. k ← k + 1
end while
ν∗ ← ν(k)
if ‖ν∗‖1/n >  then
Reinitialization with a larger γ and redo the while loop
end if
using chain rule, we can obtain
∂f
∂νi
=
∂f
∂b
T ∂b
∂νi
=
p∑
j=1
∂f
∂bj
· ∂bj
∂νi
=
∑
j:|bj |>w˜j
−2 (bj − sign(bj)w˜j − x∗j) · Aijα∗
=
p∑
j=1
−2 (bj − sign(bj)w˜j − x∗j) · Aijα∗ · I{|bi|>w˜j},
(14)
where IE is an indicator function such that IE = 1 if event E
is true; otherwise IE = 0.
The detailed derivations are as follows. To obtain ∂f∂bj , we
divide the analysis into three cases based on the value of bj :
• Case I – If |bj | ≤ w˜j , then [x̂(ν)]j = 0 and hence
∂f
∂bj
= 0.
• Case II – If bj > w˜j , then [x̂(ν)]j = sign(bj) · (bj −
w˜j) = bj − w˜j since sign(bj) = 1. Therefore, ∂f∂bj =
−2(bj− w˜j−x∗j ). We note that technically, w˜ is also a
function ofb and hence a function of ν. As a result, one
needs further chain rule factorization ∂f∂bj =
∂f
∂ bj−w˜j ·
∂ bj−w˜j
∂bj
. Here we implicitly use the fact that ∂w˜j∂bj =
∂[P(b)Tw]j
∂bj
= 0 since no matter how we permute the
entries of w, it is still a constant vector.
• Case III – If −bj > w˜j , then [x̂(ν)]j = sign(bj) ·
(−bj − w˜j) = bj + w˜j . Similar to the analysis of Case
II, we obtain ∂f∂bj = −2(bj + w˜j − x∗j ).
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Fig. 1: Assessing effect of our proposed adversarial attack on OSCAR (rightmost column) by varying the attack strength  with
 = 0.05 (top row),  = 0.1 (second row),  = 0.2 (third row) and  = 0.3 (fourth row). In each column, the ground truth refers
to x∗, OSCAR refers to the regression results without noise, and OSCAR + Attack refers to the regression results against our
designed adversarial noises. The feature groups can be adversarially misaligned even for small .
Summarizing these cases, we have a simplified expression
∂f
∂bj
= −2(bj − sign(bj)w˜j − x∗j ) if |bj | > w˜j and ∂f∂bj = 0
otherwise. Next, to obtain ∂bj∂νi , based on the definition ofbwe
have bj = constant +
∑n
k=1A
T
jkνk/α
∗ =
∑n
k=1Akjνk/α
∗.
Therefore, ∂bj∂νi = Aij/α
∗. Finally, combining the analysis of
∂f
∂bj
and ∂bj∂νi , we obtain the results in (14).
The pipeline of crafting a norm-bounded adversarial per-
turbation ν∗ for OSCAR-APO is describe in Algorithm 1. We
also note that beyond OSCAR-APO, it is possible to craft an
adversarial noise ν∗ for generic OWL-regularized regression
methods by treating (8) as a black-box function, which will
be considered in our future work.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this experiment, we generated a synthetic dataset of p =
100 features and n = 50 instances with a pre-defined group-
ing structure among the features. The features (entries in A)
were generated using a standard Gaussian distribution and
we modeled the response variable using (3). Given a norm-
bounded noise strength , we call the adversarial perturbation
found using our proposed approach (Algorithm 1) an “attack”
on the considered regression method. For the attack param-
eters, we set γ0 = 0.1 and ηk = 10−3. In Figure 1, the
x-axis represents the feature index and the y-axis represents
the coefficient values. The left column represents the ground-
truth x∗ with two defined feature groups. The middle column
shows the feature grouping obtained after running OSCAR al-
gorithm in the noiseless setting. The right column shows how
the grouping is adversely affected after our attack. We varied
the noise budget  from 0.05 to 0.3 to assess the effect of the
attack. One can observe that although some grouped features
are retained up to a certain degree, the true effect of the attack
can be seen on the features which are misaligned from their
original feature groups, even for relatively small .
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
To study the robustness of OWL-regularized regression meth-
ods in the adversarial setting, this paper proposes a novel for-
mulation for finding norm-bounded adversarial perturbations
in the measurement model and illustrates the pipeline of ad-
versarial noise generation in the case of OSCAR with APO
as its solver. In the adversarial setting, the experimental re-
sults show that our proposed approach can effectively craft
adversarial noises that severely degrade the regression perfor-
mance in identifying ground-truth grouped features, even in
the regime of small noise budgets. Our results indicate the
potential risk of lacking robustness to adversarial noises in
the tested regression method. One possible extension of our
approach is to devise adversary-resilient regression methods.
Our future work also includes developing a generic frame-
work for generating adversarial noises for the entire family of
OWL-regularized regression methods.
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